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Abstract
Public policies rooted in systemic racism and racialized violence have stripped wealth
from Black Americans. Is this wealth disparity heightened in Tulsa, Oklahoma, home to one of
the worst incidents of racial violence in America? I shed light on this question by analyzing local
housing and economic development policies and supplemental census data in Tulsa and
Oklahoma City. I find that the Race Massacre has lasting detrimental effects on the racial wealth
gap in Tulsa, likely exacerbated by policies in the 1960s-70s and the 2000s. Local and federal
reparations are necessary to address a century of racialized dispossession in Tulsa.
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Introduction
The Black Tulsa community in the 1910s and early 1920s built their wealth in
Greenwood. Dr. Charles Bate remembered the neighborhood as follows, “[Y]ou could get
anything you needed, it was there. I like to tell the story of someone coming to my [doctor’s]
office paying two dollars, and me going down to the Busy Bee Cafe and eating and paying 90
cents. And then the girl at Busy Bee going over to McGowan’s to buy some hose. McGowan was
going to buy his prescription at the pharmacy. Bowser going down to McKay’s and getting his
pants pressed. The man from there going over to the Black dentist, all within a one and a half
block area. A dollar perhaps turned over 12 or 13 times” (Butler 2021). Greenwood was known
as Black Wall Street, a prosperous Black neighborhood situated in northeast downtown Tulsa.
W. E. B Du Bois expressed that Black Tulsans’ accumulation of property and Black
prosperity was “inherently inflammatory to much of white society, with such a state of affairs it
took only a spark to start a dangerous fire” (Butler 2021). On May 30th, 1921 a white woman’s
assault allegation against a Black man sparked violence in Tulsa. Then, the Tulsa Tribune
published an article claiming that the accused Black man would be lynched after his arrest,
alarming the Greenwood community. A small scuffle between a white and Black resident
escalated to white mobs violently attacking Greenwood.
Mabel B. Little, a resident at the time of the Race Massacre offered a personal account of
her experience 30 years later: “We left our home because it was right at the foot of a high hill
called the Brickyard Hill, and the machine guns were on top of that hill and they were shooting
down over our home. In fact we were fortunate we didn’t get killed because we were just in the
midst of where the bullets were coming. So we closed our home and walked several miles. We
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didn’t get back until the next day and it was three buildings that we lost. They were all paid for;
we didn’t owe anyone anything. We had decided to get out of debt and pay cash for everything,
and we thought we had it made. After we lost everything, we only had fifty dollars in cash
money. We had to start all over again” (Butler 2021). Her experience was emblematic.
An estimated 300 Black Tulsans were murdered (the number remains unknown and could
be higher) and Greenwood was destroyed on May 31st and June 1st, 1921; the most tragic racial
violence in American history. The 1921 Race Massacre significantly contributed to the
decimation of wealth in the Tulsa, Oklahoma Greenwood community. In 1921, Greenwood
suffered an estimated $1.8 million (1921 dollars) in destruction, spanning from homes to
businesses, and other properties (Messer, Shriver, and Adams 2018). Records show that 35 city
blocks were destroyed, including 1,200 family homes. In today’s market, the destruction of 1,200
homes would be an estimated $150 million loss. The additional loss of personal assets and
Black-owned businesses might amount to another $50 million (Messer, Shriver, and Adams
2018). It is necessary to note that while the emotional and psychological toll on past, current, and
future residents of North Tulsa is too vast to account for numerically, this deliberate act of
violence against a Black community remains a tragedy for Greenwood.
Almost one hundred years ago, on June 3, 1921, the Tulsa Tribune published an article
titled “Plan to Move Negroes into New District.” The article provides evidence of deliberate
policy actions to displace victims of the Tulsa Race Massacre days after the attack. Rather than
helping displaced victims, Tulsa Mayor T.D. Evans focused on plans to build a new industrial
district where Greenwood had stood.
The Massacre had consequences well beyond this initiative. Over the past century, the
city of Tulsa enacted a series of racialized policies that detrimentally affect Black wealth and
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wellbeing. For example, in 1967, Tulsa’s urban renewal efforts pushed an interstate through
Greenwood. And in addition to Black Greenwood businesses being destroyed for a second time
to make room for highways, federally funded housing projects were concentrated in North Tulsa
against Black leaders protests. The past two decades continue this pattern of destruction to the
Black community as publicly subsidized luxury apartments encroach on North Tulsa (Marshall).
Over the past century, white folks largely ignored the Race Massacre and its
consequences. Before a memorial in 1996 for the 75th anniversary, which spurred the Oklahoma
government to create a commission to study the Race Massacre, the general public did not
acknowledge the event. Although the conversations in Tulsa and nationally around the Race
Massacre have heightened in the past couple years leading up to the 2021 centennial, the
narrative surrounding social and economic inequities for Black Tulsans is still rarely talked about
at the systemic level.
In this paper I connect and synthesize racial violence with historical policies and events
embedded in structural racism, beginning with the Race Massacre and ending with present day
policies that affect wealth outcomes for Black residents in Tulsa and Oklahoma City. To answer
my primary research question, ‘What is the relationship between current wealth disparities in
Tulsa and the political legacy of the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre?,’ I begin by discussing the more
general scholarly conversation surrounding the connection between housing and wealth and
differences between homeowners and renters. I then situate these disparities in the racial
capitalism conversation. Next, I detail the varied methodological tools necessary to assess wealth
disparity in Tulsa. I establish the context of federal policies and trends during three significant
time periods before comparing local actions in Tulsa with those in Oklahoma City, cities with
similar state and demographic constraints but varied specific local histories. I enhance
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comparison between Tulsa and Oklahoma City with housing and demographic data from 1960,
1970, and 2000 to 2016. 100 years after state-sanctioned racial violence decimated the center of
Black economic life, my research contextualizes Tulsa’s tragic racial history with current
housing and wealth disparities to add nuance to the broader conversation surrounding systemic
racism.

Literature Review
Homeownership, Government Subsidy, and Racial Wealth Gaps
In 1921, 56 years after slavery was legally abolished, the failed reconstruction period
restricted Black Americans’ ability to build wealth. Today, high rates of wealth inequality persist
between white Americans and Black and Latinx Americans. Although the income gap is rather
large between white and Black as well as white and Latinx households, around $40,000, the
wealth gap is even more staggering. While the median wealth in white households is more than
$110,000, the same figure is around $8,000 in Latinx households and a little over $7,000 in
Black households (Keister et al. 2015). Most existing literature documents wealth inequality;
however the factors that affect wealth in American households, homeownership, income, and
education, are discussed.
Cumulative years of homeownership are often cited as one of the most important
contributors to wealth. Keister et al., a myriad of social science scholars, found that an
individual’s years of homeownership account for around 38% of the observed wealth gap
between white and Black households (2015). Their post-recession study also found that years of
homeownership account for 38% of the racial wealth gap, the most significant factor, compared
to education, inheritances, and income. Income was the second highest factor, accounting for
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17% of the racial wealth gap (Keister et al. 2015). The racial homeownership gap is staggering;
white households average homeownership rate is 73% while Black households average rate is
45% (Ibid). Di et al. researched the impact of homeownership on household net wealth
accumulation by using University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a
longitudinal household survey collecting data from 1968 to 2001. Di et al. solely examined
households that rented in 1989. They tracked and measured differences between those who
transitioned to homeowning between 1989 and 2001, using years of homeownership as the
independent variable, and those who remained renters (2007). The study found that the longer
households owned homes, the greater the household net wealth and non-housing wealth, while
controlling for education, income, and other sources of wealth, suggesting that homeownership
itself builds wealth (Di et al. 2007).
Wainer and Zabel add nuance to this scholarship by considering periods of growth and
recession. They look at low-income families and find that homeownership does not always
increase wealth accumulation (2019). When low-income households bought a home between
1989 and 1999, their 2011 wealth experienced an increase. However, households that bought
homes in the early 2000s during the Great Recession did not experience greater wealth
accumulation (Wainer and Zabel 2019). Di et al.’s (2007) longitudinal design reflects the typical
long-term housing market. Although their study’s time period does not include the 2008
recession, the authors note that short term wealth accumulation is sensitive to time but over a
long enough period, the changing market is not as important to overall wealth (Di et al. 2007).
Various factors undergird homeownership as a crucial component to accumulating wealth
over time. The United States at the federal level offers tax incentives for homeownership, valued
at $90 billion a year, primarily through the mortgage interest deduction (MID) and capital gains
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exclusion (Schuetz 2019). The US government spends double the amount on the MID than on
other housing programs, including public housing and Section 8 vouchers (Shapiro and Wolff
2001). In addition to the federal government offering benefits for homeownership, Herbert et al.
(2013) argue that the other four factors in the accumulation of wealth include amortizing
mortgages, real appreciation over time, refinancing, and a hedge against inflation in rents over
time. However Herbert et al. (2013) notes that foreclosures decimate wealth accrued from home
owning and have other costs associated with them, which are often likely to hurt lower income
households. At the local level, zoning, land use, and economic development policies affect if
areas experience an appreciation or depreciation of value, which influences wealth accumulation
(Schuetz 2019).
Housing policies are situated in systemic racism, disproportionately affecting Black
Americans’ ability to own homes and build wealth. Through an analysis of a large nonprime
loans dataset, Herbert et al. (2013) found that Black Americans were significantly more likely
than white Americans to receive mortgages and refinance loans that were higher in price.
Analyzing historic policies spanning from 1910 to 1948, Woods noted the influence of public
policies on the racial wealth gap and Black homeowner’s higher mortgages, noting racially
restrictive covenants, redlining, and the GI bill, which inhibited Black Americans from
generating family wealth (Woods 2018). In addition to these policies discriminating against
Black and Brown Americans, the policies utilized tax dollars to help white Americans build
wealth, having lasting effects on racial wealth gaps. For example, in the 2008 Great Recession,
Black households had more financial and wealth losses compared to white Americans shown
through descriptive and regression results using the Survey of Consumer Finances longitudinal
data from 1989 to 2013 (Zhang and Feng 2017). Killewald and Bryan (2018) find that historic
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structurally racist policies greatly affect the gap in wealth accumulation. Using longitudinal data
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, they found differences in wealth between time
periods and created multiple models to closely examine social origins, income and education,
and family and household. They also determined that Black wealth disparities are recreated in
current generations after adjusting for generational wealth disparities in their models (Killewald
and Bryan 2018). Thus, current policies and practices surrounding housing remain
discriminatory and embedded in perpetuated structural racism.
Renters are left without access to many of the wealth building subsidies noted above
(Schuetz 2019). Monthly rent payments solely cover the cost of housing for that time period,
potentially decimating savings while homeowners are accumulating wealth (Schuetz 2019).
Schuetz’s study finds that renters also have less stability and predictability in their housing.
While homeowners usually have a fixed rate mortgage, with monthly housing costs remaining
stable, renters only know their rent price for a typical year-long lease (Schuetz 2019). Herbert et
al.’s study found that in comparison to homeowners, including low-income and minority
households that often have a lower gain in wealth due to discriminatory practices, renters do not
see any long-term improvements in wealth and for the most part have less accumulated wealth
(2013). For renters, the potential of being evicted adds to the inherent instability of renting.
In addition to homeownership being restricted through racist policies, Black renters also
face unfair eviction rates. Sociologist Matthew Desmond has done extensive research in
Milwaukee using quantitative court eviction data and a qualitative study on evicted tenants. He
found that, in general, eviction likelihood increased with various factors including
socioeconomic status, race, number of children, and rental payment history (Desmond and
Gershenson 2016). Specifically, Latinx and Black female renters were the demographic facing
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the highest number of court evictions, twice as likely as their male counterparts (Desmond 2012).
In Milwaukee, Black women compose 9.6% of the city’s population but 30% of evictions
(Desmond 2014). In Richmond, Virginia, Benjamin Teresa in “The Geography of Eviction in
Richmond: Beyond Poverty” used census blocks to determine geographic aspects of high
eviction rates. He found that the highest rates of evictions are strictly in northside and southside
Richmond, and correlate with the share of Black and Latinx residents, but not poverty levels
(Teresa 2019). These studies found an unsurprising but striking racial connection for high rates
of eviction, but they only cited race as an indicator of evictions, failing to explain the vast
structural racism associated with using race as a variable and the racial connection to evictions.
Overt racial violence from landlords to tenants happens often, usually through eviction threats.
These threats usually coerce tenants to comply with financial extraction and negligent housing
tendencies (Blomey 2019).
Racial Capitalism and Racial Banishment
It is important to place housing and wealth inequality in the United States in the context
of racial capitalism along with state-based dispossession and subordination. Racial capitalism, a
concept introduced by Cedric Robinson and Nancy Leong, is the dependence of capital success
on racialized dispossession, genocide, and settler colonialism (2000). Both historically and today,
the system of capitalism operates by using race as a means to profit from unpaid or low wage
labor, accumulation of land value, and other exploitative measures (Robinson 2000).
In the scope of the US housing system, racial capitalism occurs through white domination
of land ownership. The housing system benefits white Americans purchasing homes and
subsequently accumulating wealth. In homeownership, racial capitalism is present through
higher mortgage and interest rates for Black homeowners and the devaluation of neighborhoods
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of color, where Black and Brown Americans receive less or close to zero net returns on
homeownership. Subprime lenders also usually seize on Black neighborhoods, resulting in
higher rates of foreclosure for Black homeowners (Markley et al. 2020).
In addition, the landlord and tenant relationship is intrinsically connected to racial
capitalism with landlords exponentially profiting from the overwhelming proportion of Black
and Brown renters. Racial capitalism appears both in high rent prices that continue to rise
without renters having autonomy over their home while predominantly white landlords and
institutions continuously extract means from Black and Brown renters.
The United States continues to exploit Black Americans through dispossession and
subordination. Ananya Roy establishes a concept of racial banishment that encompasses multiple
means of dispossession, rather than displacement, rooted in state violence against racialized
persons (Roy 2019). This concept criticizes previous frameworks surrounding displacement,
including literature on evictions, for not entirely examining the role of the United States and
race-based violence (Roy 2019). Roy analyzes evictions as using legal means to banish Black
people, particularly Black women, arguing it is a current form of racially restrictive covenants
and redlining (2019). Through the power of state institutions, such as political and judicial
forces, the United States is continuing spatial segregation and banishing Black Americans from
every aspect of residential life (Roy 2019). These means are represented in both public policies
and deliberate acts of violence and negligence (Roy 2019). In addition to historically racist
policies, events rooted in state-based violence against Black communities have devastated and
destroyed Black wealth and housing. Race massacres, police brutality, and mass incarceration are
all acts of violence that deliberately prevent Black Americans from building wealth. These acts,
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along with the lack of enforcing laws on landlords’ and lenders’ illegal practices, perpetuate
racial capitalism (Blomey 2019).

Methods
To explore if there is a relationship between the current wealth disparity in Tulsa,
Oklahoma and the historical and political legacy of the 1921 Race Massacre, I compare Tulsa to
Oklahoma City, holding constant state policies, state spending, and overall state history and
culture. This “most similar” comparison illuminates the influence of the Race Massacre in
differences in Black wealth observed today.
In both cities, I use process tracing to analyze local housing and economic development
policies in three significant time periods for urban policy, the 1920s-1930s, 1960s-1980s, and
2000s-2010s. My analysis includes policies that segregate or displace Black populations, policies
that increase land value and push lower income residents out, policies that create publically
funded urban developments and housing projects, and other tax expenditure policies that
encourage economic disparities. I rely on local newspapers and original policy documents as
primary sources.
It is necessary to situate path dependency in my research to provide a broader context for
my process tracing analysis. Path dependency, in a policy context, is a theory based in historical
institutionalism, generally stating that the formation of institutions and policies affect future
decisions and policies (Greener 2005). In other words, the current events surrounding a policy or
institution are contingent upon when and how past critical events unfold (Howlett 2009). Path
dependency does not necessarily happen linearly, an event could pivot the trajectory of a process
or even reverse it. (Pierson 2000).
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In policies, path dependency happens within macro, meso, and micro levels. Macro is
defined as the larger institutions at play while micro is the policy actions that happen within
individuals or communities; meso is examined as the crossroad between systemic issues and the
outcome of policies (Howlett 2009). According to Pierson, political actions inherently happen
through collective action, are framed in institutions, have political authority, and are often
complex, resulting in consequences for participants (2000). My analysis centers meso processes,
where systemic racism is interconnected to the local policies at play. I trace how the previous and
current trajectories of institutions and policies shape the local sphere of wealth and housing.
My historically informed policy analyses of Tulsa and Oklahoma City are supplemented
by housing and demographic census data. Although 1920, 1930, and 1940 housing census data
for the first time period of my case studies does not exist, I used 1960 and 1970 census data to
examine the housing and demographic change in specific geographic areas where urban renewal
projects occured. The data include population by race, number of renter and owner occupied
housing, and number of units in different price ranges for each census tract. For the third time
period, I focused on changes in areas where economic development projects happened.
Subsequently, I examine Tulsa, North Tulsa, Oklahoma City and Northeast Oklahoma City in
general as well as in comparison to one another. For data between 2000 and 2016, Princeton’s
Eviction Lab dataset was utilized. The data include racial demographics, median property values,
median household income, number of evictions, number of eviction filings, and population for
each census block (coded by GEOIDS). Lastly, I used the eviction dataset to create census tract
maps in ArcGIS to visually see where the lowest and highest property values are in Tulsa and
Oklahoma City in relation to majority Black census tracts. These data provide evidence for
policy change and outcomes in both Tulsa and Oklahoma City, which shed light on large scale
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housing insecurity and wealth disparity. Before beginning my comparative analysis, I illuminate
national policy trends discouraging the accumulation of Black wealth.

National Trends
Table 1: Federal Policies and Events
1919

“Red Summer”

1930s

Homeowners Loan Corporation (HOLC) Maps

1934

National Housing Act

1944

G.I. Bill

1949

Federal Housing Act

1954

Housing Act

1956

National Defense Highway Act

1964

Civil Rights Act

1974

Housing and Community Development Act

1980s

Reagan Cuts Federal Grants to Cities

2000s

Tax Increment Financing

2000s

City Governments Increase Fees and Taxes

In this study, I focus on urban public policies that stimulate white wealth and hinder
Black wealth across three distinct periods of city life. I first explore the decades immediately
following the Race Massacre to assess its proximate impacts on Black wealth. Next, I explore the
period building to and immediately following the civil rights movement. This analysis allows
time for post WWII policies to take effect and to explore the interaction between these policies
and those that were influenced by the civil rights movement. Finally, I explore the last two
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decades to understand the housing efforts local municipalities took after large scale federal
programs ended during the Reagan era. Table 1 above makes clear that many important policies
and developments occured between the 1930s and 1960s. However, I do not specifically examine
this time period at the local level because of the delay between passing federal policies and local
implementation of these policies, such as the gap between the 1956 Highway Act and the
construction of Tulsa’s I-244 in 1967. Although important events across the federal, state, and
local levels occur outside of these three time periods, my focus is on the most severe events and
how policies are implemented across localities to highlight differences between national trends
and Tulsa, which might suggest that the Race Massacre continues to exert disadvantages to a
greater extent than in other cities.
Housing Policies
In the early 1920s, Black Americans faced relentless racism in every facet of life. The
Great Migration led to many Southern Black Americans moving to northern cities, however
restaurants and stores in the north refused to serve Black customers, banks rejected loans, doctors
denied service, and public life was segregated (Judd and Hinze 2019, 243). Furthermore,
lynchings remained common and accepted by white Americans. Multiple race massacres
occurred during this time; one of the first was in East Saint Louis on July 2nd, 1917, where 39
Black people were murdered by white mobs (Ibid). Highlighted in Table 1 above, the summer of
1919 was labelled the “Red Summer,” because race massacres occurred in more than 20 cities.
Between July 1917 and March 1921, Chicago alone had 58 racial bombings. In 1925, Black
Detroit residents tried to move into white neighborhoods and faced cross burnings, vandalism,
and mob violence (Ibid).
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Racialized violent acts dwindled as the United States transitioned to the 1930s, yet
systemic racism continued in the form of housing policies. Historic public policies, including
racially restrictive covenants and redlining, influenced racial wealth disparity, inhibiting Black
Americans from generating family wealth (Woods 2018). Neighborhoods attached racially
restrictive covenants to property deeds, banning Black Americans from buying or renting homes.
The deeds were filed with the county clerk and enforced by the courts. In the 1930s, the Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC), a federal agency created through the New Deal, mapped the
neighborhoods categorized by risky or safe for lending purposes in around 239 cities (Shapiro
and Wolff 2001). Majority Black neighborhoods were intentionally coded as red, resulting in
private lenders and banks denying mortgages in these “risky” investment areas (Judd and Hinze
2019, 151). The National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA), which adopted the discriminatory HOLC redlining maps to offer government backed
low-interest loans for purchasing homes (Ibid). White Americans that received FHA-backed
loans paid small down payments and had up to 30 years to pay back the principal and interest on
the mortgage (Ibid). FHA paid up to 80% of the property value, valued around $109 billion for
approximately 9.5 million units insured between 1934 and 1975 (Ibid). FHA-supported loans
drastically increased homeownership, 44% in 1940 compared to 63% in 1970, supporting white
wealth while Black Americans were denied these loans (Judd and Hinze 2019, 152). In addition
to discriminating against Black and Brown Americans, these policies utilized tax dollars to help
white Americans build wealth, having lasting effects on wealth disparities.
Table 1 above depicts the 1940s and 50s federal policies that led to local urban renewal
efforts in the 1960s. Title I of the Federal Housing Act of 1949 authorized grants and loans to
local agencies for redevelopment under conditions imposed by the federal government. Referred
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to as Title I urban renewal projects, the program gave payments for slum clearance and urban
redevelopment (HUD 2020). The Housing Act of 1954 expanded the urban renewal program,
authorizing grants for restoring blighted areas and building public housing programs for residents
displaced from urban renewal (HUD 2020). While urban renewal funding levelled Black
neighborhoods, displaced their residents, and constructed isolating housing projects, federal
policies funded the continuously growing white suburban housing market. Federal housing
policies and urban renewal policies are an extension of racial violence, where legal means are
used to harm Black communities.
During this time, the Housing and Home Finance Agency delegated federal responsibility
of these projects to the Urban Renewal Administration (URA) (Johnstone 1957). URA
established regional federal offices across the United States, where most local agencies submitted
their proposals for grants. After securing federal funding, the local agencies bought properties
and sold them to a private construction company that carried out the redevelopment plan
(Johnstone 1957). These acts prioritized private developers to carry out the government initiated
projects. Government agencies forged alliances with private businesses, an average of $35.8
billion public dollars went towards private investment from these federal policies by 1968 (Judd
and Hinze 2019, 132). Federal administrators allocated two-thirds of public funds, a $13 billion
total spent on urban renewal initiatives between 1953 and 1986, for commercial businesses
because of financing projects that allocated only 51% of projects to housing due to the
misleading interpretation of the housing policy (Judd and Hinze 2019, 141).
In 1974, these programs merged with the Housing and Community Development Act.
This policy created the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), which compiled seven
different grant programs, one for neighborhood development and another for urban renewal
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(Judd and Hinze 2019, 184). If cities met a specific funding formula they automatically qualified
for the block grant, however cities were also required to apply and give quarterly financial
updates to HUD in order to receive the funding (Ibid). CDBG had similar objectives as the
previous housing acts, prioritizing private businesses over urban inner city neighborhoods’
interests.
Transportation and Urban Financing Policies
In addition to significant federal housing policies, federal financing for the nation-wide
interstate network followed by Reagan era public spending cuts critically affected urban policies.
The main purpose of Eisenhower’s 1956 National Defense Highway Act was to build a national
highway system that connected state capitals and major cities, the other purpose was to easily
mobilize the military for nuclear attacks (Judd and Hinze 2019, 160). The federal government
allocated funding to state highway departments based on their calculated need, resulting in urban
areas receiving the most funding (Ibid). Most city officials agreed with the policy, but regardless,
local governments could not refuse participation (Ibid). The highway act resulted in
neighborhoods across the United States being torn down for construction between 1956 and into
the 1990s, separating communities.
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration drastically reduced federal funding for urban
areas, ending the era of large-scale federal policies funding housing and economic development
in US cities, giving the private market more power in development. Between 1980 and 1987,
nine programs that provided grants to local city governments were cut by 47% (Judd and Hinze
2019, 341). The Reagan administration also decreased the CDBG funding by 20% during the
same time period (Ibid). The remainder of the urban federal grant allocations shifted towards
more prosperous urban areas rather than impoverished cities (Ibid).
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By the 2000s, cities utilized their own resources and public policies to promote the
redevelopment of historical districts to provide entertainment for residents and compete with
other cities for tourism (Judd and Hinze 2019, 386). Cities continuously focused on downtown
redevelopment in the 21st century, generally including corporate buildings, entertainment venues
such as sports arenas and convention centers, and upscale housing (Ibid). These trends,
particularly expensive apartments and lofts, caused neighborhood gentrification, in which white
affluent young people and professionals moved into areas where people of color and working
class residents previously resided (Judd and Hinze 2019, 362). Public interest in downtown
“improvements” is connected to the highly competitive global economy, where downtowns
increasingly became hubs for financial institutions, telecommunication, and general corporate
services (Ibid). Cities were competing for corporate headquarters and the influx of wealthier
professionals.
A majority of these projects to promote tourism and entertainment were subsidized by
local funding. Mayors, city council members, and other local government officials generally
supported giving public dollars to private developments to increase their affluent prospects. By
2003, a majority of cities and states across the United States imposed new city fees or increased
public fees that already existed to increase local revenues (Judd and Hinze 2019, 342).
Furthermore, city officials have assigned administrator roles to special purpose authorities for
large urban projects, where people who were not democratically elected to office make important
decisions that affect taxpayers. The special purpose authorities often administer the tax increment
finance (TIF) districts. This policy sections off specific land areas and takes the increase of
property taxes in a specified time span to fund a specific project, often private developments
(Judd and Hinze 2019, 356). TIF funded projects and other local policy initiatives to incentivize
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private businesses receive a mix of criticism and praise, depending on the local context. These
national policies paved the way for state and local actions that exacerbated Black Oklahomans’
access to capital.

Tulsa
Table 2: 1921-Present
June 3 1921

Fire Zoning Ordinance

September 1921

Lockard v. T.D. Evans, Mayor

1922 - 1926

Redfearn v. American Central Insurance

1963 - 1969

Seminole Hills Projects

1967 - 1979

Downtown Northwest Project

1967 - 1975

Westbank Project

1967 - 1975

Interstate 244

2003 - 2016

Blue Dome TIF District

1993 - 2017

Tulsa Arts District TIF District

2003

Vision 2025

2010

PlaniTulsa and Downtown Area Master Plan
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Map 1: Tulsa Neighborhoods Referenced

This year Tulsa commemorates the centennial of the Race Massacre. Here, I detail racial,
housing and economic development policies that span the time period from the massacre to
today, where racial violence and public policy work in concert to eradicate Black wealth. In
1921, the mayor and city commissioners lacked a relief response and implemented displacement
policies in the aftermath of the Race Massacre, hampering Black Tulsans ability to rebuild their
homes and neighborhoods. Four decades later, Tulsa officials’ urban renewal projects destroyed
the rebuilt Greenwood businesses and North Tulsa homes (see Map 1 above), halting Black
wealth accumulation post-Massacre. Recently, local tax policies to fund a convention center,
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arena, and luxury housing in downtown Tulsa have priced Black property owners out of
Greenwood.
Tulsa 1921 Race Massacre
In the early 20th century oil was found in Tulsa County and the city was built to support
oil companies and business persons. At the same time, Tulsa’s Greenwood district, also known as
Black Wall Street, was a thriving Black business district and neighborhood. But, on May 31 and
June 1, 1921, responding to a clash in downtown surrounding the sexual assault allegation, white
mobs attacked the Black Greenwood community in Tulsa, Oklahoma, murdering approximately
300 Black Tulsans (the number remains unknown and could be higher) and burning 35 blocks of
Black homes and businesses. Although previous accounts of the Tulsa Race Massacre claimed
the violent white mobs acted on allegations of a Black man assaulting a white woman, historians
have uncovered evidence that suggests that Tulsa officials, many of them leaders or members of
the Ku Klux Klan, planned this atrocious racial mass murder and destruction (Krehbiel 2019).
New accounts suggest that Tulsa’s white ruling class likely believed Black Tulsans were
becoming too prosperous and purposely staged riots to destroy their houses and businesses to
strip away their livelihood and wealth. A key piece of evidence comes from the mayor’s actions
(or lack thereof) as the smoke from Greenwood fires cleared. City officials, including the mayor
T.D. Evans and the city commission failed to immediately provide relief for Black residents who
were homeless, had their business destroyed, or were out of a job. Rather, the Red Cross stepped
in to provide shelter and basic necessities.
The arson during the Race Massacre rendered approximately 10,000 Black Tulsans
homeless. Red Cross officials began to provide medical care on June 1 (Willows 1921). On June
2, T.D. Evans, the Tulsa mayor, wrote to the Red Cross asking it to, “Please establish
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headquarters for all relief work and bring all organizations who can assist you to your aid.” In
addition, Evans declared, “The responsibility is placed in your hands entirely,” and in doing so
publicly registered he and the city’s blatant indifference towards relief efforts (Willows 1921).
On June 3, Maurice Willows, a national Red Cross representative, traveled to Tulsa, helping to
set up shelters at Booker T. Washington High School and the Headquarters and Relief Depot at
the Fairgrounds. The thousands unable to be housed at those locations pitched tents surrounding
the destroyed properties (Willows 1921). In total, Tulsa only provided $101,395 for relief, a
small fraction of the overall cost of damage, which all went to the Red Cross for their relief
program (Willows 1921).
Tulsa’s initial indifference continued in the days and decades to come. The Public
Welfare Board, charged with leading the Massacre’s aftermath, refused external donations,
claiming “Tulsa is going to take care of this problem herself” (“Tent Colony” 1921). By June 5,
the 7-member board’s request for donations from local residents had reached approximately
$9,000. According to the Tulsa Tribune, “subscriptions were not being received in the number
which the board must receive them if the immense work of feeding and housing several thousand
homeless [Black Tulsans] is to go on unhampered” (“Give at Once” 1921).
Tulsa’s negligence went further: rather than the Public Welfare Board contributing to
relief efforts with the Red Cross, the group focused on plans put forward by the Real Estate
Exchange on June 3rd to displace Black Tulsans from their neighborhood for the long term. The
Exchange was composed of other wealthy white prominent Tulsa men, including Tate Brady, a
known Ku Klux Klan member. After the Real Estate Exchange surveyed the decimated area, they
recommended the Public Welfare Board and city commission build “an industrial and wholesale
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district crosscut by railroad yards,” rather than rebuild homes and businesses (“Plan to Move”
1921). The Exchange’s reason to relocate Black Tulsans was bluntly racist.
“We further believe that the two races being divided by an industrial section will draw more distinctive
lines between them and thereby eliminate the intermingling of the lower elements of the two races, which
in our opinion is the root of the evil which should not exist.” (“Plan to Move” 2021).

Tulsa’s white leaders recognized that the new industrial district would only succeed if Black
property owners sold their property and bought new property in the relocated district (Ibid).
Thus, the Exchange proposed to create a new neighborhood for Black Tulsans by falsely
promising affordable property with working sewer, water, gas, street cars, and electric lights,
which were not previously provided by the city (Ibid). Black residents were skeptical of the plan.
Although primary accounts from Black Tulsans are difficult to find from 1921, the Tulsa Red
Cross leader Maurice Willows wrote that Black Tulsans consistently told city officials “pay us
for what we have lost and we will talk to you about selling what we have left” (Willows 1921).
Without needing confirmation from city officials for appraisals, on June 3, the Real
Estate Exchange began appraising property in Greenwood to facilitate a hastily made new
industrial district (“Plan to Move” 1921). By June 5, the Exchange estimated the overall cost of
decimated property, personal and business, to be between $1.5 million and $2 million (“Tulsa
Loss in Fire” 1921). The Exchange found that 503 houses were completely destroyed, while
more had substantial damage. Meredith J. Glass, the president of the Real Estate Exchange, said
the houses ranged in value from $100 to $4,500 with an average of $1,000. Glass put the average
total damage of property at $500,000 and other personal property at $350,000 (Ibid). Though
later evidence from Maurice Willow offered a total estimate of destroyed Black property at $3.5
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million, $51.7 million in today’s dollars , which Willow claimed was a conservative amount
(Willows 1921).
The new industrial district plan and property appraisals were confirmed by Tulsa officials
almost immediately. Upon approval, the Public Welfare Board members quickly returned to
routine tasks, signifying that their massacre response work was finished. The Tulsa Tribune
noted that Tulsa officials in a press conference stated their priorities were policing and building
the newly proposed industrial district from the ruins, while thousands of Black Tulsans were still
without housing, food, and basic material goods (“Board Plans” 1921).
On June 7th, the city commission passed a fire ordinance that hindered rebuilding
Greenwood property, highlighted above in the Table 2 (“Section Abolished” 1921). This fire
ordinance prevents the rebuilding of any structures that are not fire-proof or slow-burning
construction, which were expensive materials (Ibid). The Tulsa Tribune on June 7th announced
that “35 blocks of the [Greenwood area] south of Standpipe Hill, now in ruins following the fire
of last Wednesday morning will never again be a [Black neighborhood] but will become a
wholesale and industrial center” (Ibid).
The zoning ordinance resulted in a court case that reached the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
Lockard v. T.D. Evans, Mayor, also noted in Table 2. The plaintiff, Joe Lockard, owned a wood
framed house in Greenwood that burned down in the Massacre. Lawyer B.C. Franklin led this
case against T.D. Evans, arguing:
“The great holocaust on the 1st of June, and by the action of the defendant herein your petition and those
dependent upon him, and others in the community similarly situated are being deprived of their property
and their property rights without due process of the law that the passage of and enforce of said purporte
1
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ordinance at the time passed and at the time that it is being enforced, and under the conditions and
circumstances surrounding and leading up to same is tantamount to confiscation of the property of the
plaintiff and others similarly situated.” (Section VI of Lockard v. T.D. Evans, Mayor)

In late September 1921, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the ordinance to be unconstitutional
(Heath 2020). After the ruling, around fifteen carpenters worked daily to build wooden shacks to
replace the tents many were living in for 5 to 7 months (Willows 1921). As this work by Black
Tulsans continued, white Tulsans benefited from federally financed homeownership loans that
raised their wealth accumulation.
Greenwood never received adequate funding from Tulsa or insurance companies. The
Tulsa County Bar Association on June 7th determined that the city and county of Tulsa was not
legally responsible for widespread property damage. Instead, property owners had to pay for
repair and reconstruction themselves (“City is Not Liable” 1921). Additionally, the Real Estate
Exchange claimed to prepare files for insurance claims and legal transactions for all property
owners in Greenwood for free and urged residents not to consult outside attorneys or file for
insurance separately (“Realtors Start Task” 1921). However, insurance companies refused to
offer assistance to Black residents because of the riot clause in insurance policies, which the Real
Estate Exchange did not help litigate (Willows 1921).
On May 31, 1922, William Redfearn, a white Tulsan who owned property that was
destroyed in the Massacre filed a lawsuit against the American Central Insurance company,
arguing that the riot clause was not applicable to the massacre because law enforcement officials
were involved in the destruction (Redfearn v. American Central Insurance). The case went to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court on January 12, 1926, where the court upheld the lower court decision,
citing that there was not enough evidence of the Tulsa Police Department aiding in the violence
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or directing law enforcement officials to participate in the Massacre (Redfearn v. American
Central Insurance).
The final hope for Greenwood property owners to receive money from insurance
companies ended with the Redfearn v. American Central Insurance suit. However, the case
detailed many witness accounts of Tulsa officials participating in the Race Massacre. Others
believe that a group with a stake in the Real Estate Exchange planned and organized the
widespread fires in Greenwood (Krehbiel 2019, 112). After the Red Cross left Tulsa on
December 31, 1921, community members spent the next decade rebuilding Greenwood and
North Tulsa. Four decades later, the city of Tulsa again displaced Greenwood businesses and
Black homeowners through urban renewal policies.
Tulsa 1960-1970 Urban Renewal: Seminole Hills, Downtown Northwest, and Interstate 244
Following the Tulsa Race Massacre, Greenwood and North Tulsa were able to slowly
rebuild. But the pace of renewal quickened in Tulsa, aided by federal urban renewal grants
through the Federal Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 and interstate grants through the Federal
Highway Act of 1956.
The city commision created the Tulsa Urban Renewal Authority (TURA) in July of 1959
to spearhead federally funded urban renewal projects (Bachelder 1962). Three years later, on
October 19th, 1962, the Seminole Hills urban renewal plan unanimously passed in the city
commission; Map 1 indicates the location of this project. A $284,167.75 payment from the
federal government in February 1963 permitted TURA to begin purchasing 167 properties in a
91 acre one mile northeast of Greenwood in North Tulsa (“TURA Gets” 1963). These properties
ranged from $1,600 to $13,400 and averaged $5,500 (Ibid). Using US census data for 1960, I
located the census tract where the Seminole Hills project occurred and found that 98.9% of the
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tract was Black. The percent of renter occupied units was 27.12%. A majority of these residents
2

protested the purchase of their properties for the Seminole Hills project. One resident offered a
detailed account to The Tulsa Daily World, “Why do they want to take us from our homes, put us
out and put other people in them?” while another resident stated “I don’t know where [they] get
this blight. Here [they’re] going to uproot 120 families to put in 120 more families.” (Bachelder
1962). The Tulsa Daily World also quoted a woman who believed TURA was not fairly paying
her, wanting $8000 for her property while the authority only offered $4000 (Ibid). Besides
purchasing residents’ properties, later accounts from Robert Shelton, the President of the Tulsa
Property Owners Association, speculated that TURA did not assist these homeowners in moving
or finding new housing (Smith 2019, 103).
Tulsa ignored residents’ protests. The Tulsa Tribune documented the process of Seminole
Hills in a 1966 article: TURA cleared these homes and sold the property to Seminole Hills
Associates, a private construction company created by three Tulsans, who built 75 3-bedroom
houses (Birmingham 1966). Home Builders Demonstration, a non-profit funded by an additional
federal grant, bought each house for $9,000 from Seminole Hills Associates and chose the new
residents whose monthly income was required to be between $175 and $325 (Ibid). The project’s
goal was for these residents to own the home in 5 years by accruing a $300 down payment in
addition to paying $50 a month for rent (Ibid). Once they secured the down payment, the
residents could apply for an FHA insured loan to take out a mortgage and purchase the home
(Ibid). The first residents moved in on March 20th, 1964 and by March 1969 22 families
purchased their home. The Tulsa Tribune interviewed the project supervisor and found that
around 25 other residents were unable to obtain a loan after the FHA refused applications, even
2
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though these residents met the $300 down payment (Ridenour 1969). The project supervisor
thought these rejections were unfair, alluding to the possibility of race playing a role in loan
refusals (Ibid). Because residents were unable to purchase these homes and had to move out, the
Tulsa Housing Authority (THA), created in 1967, purchased the 29 unoccupied Seminole Hills’
houses after receiving a federal grant to renovate the properties in 1969 (Levy 1969). THA, the
local agency that administers public housing, rented them to low income families (Ridenour
1969).
A second housing project, Seminole Hills Village, was proposed in early 1967 as an
addition to the project. The company that built the first project, Seminole Hills Associates,
proposed a housing complex on the same land that TURA acquired in 1963 (“Three Builders”
1967). In December 1967, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
which replaced the Housing and Home Finance Agency in 1965, secured funding for Seminole
Hills Associates to build 145 one, two, or three bedroom apartments and 5 units single family
dwellings (Ibid). The Tulsa Housing Authority purchased the complex and rented out units to
tenants with an annual income of $3,900 or less (“TURA Still” 1967). Black Tulsa leaders
criticized the housing plan for its concentration of low income housing in North Tulsa. Willard
Van, the executive secretary of Tulsa’s NAACP in 1967, favored more public housing in general
but insisted it be distributed across Tulsa rather than concentrated in North Tulsa, stating “we do
not want to perpetuate a ghetto, we do not wish to build a ghetto” (Ibid). Others pressured THA
to have the project be of mixed economic levels rather than all low income residents (Ibid).
These efforts ultimately failed; residents first moved into the complex in early 1969.
1970 census data for the Seminole Hill’s census tract shows that there was not a
demographic change between 1960 and 1970 but the percent of renter occupied units increased
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from 27.12% to 48.25% in the census tract. Moreover, this change manifests in the shift in
owner and rental units by price. For houses that were owned for $5000 and under, 239 units in
1960 went to 80 units in 1970. Similarly, the low to mid renting range ($20-$69 a month) saw an
increase from 78 units in 1960 to 417 units in 1970. While the number of owned houses between
$5000 to $12499 stay constant across the decade, the houses between the $12,500 and $19,999
range increase from 29 to 104.
THA increased the amount of public housing in North Tulsa throughout the 1970s,
building 4 low income housing complexes in a 2 mile radius of Seminole Hills by 1978 and
acquiring a total of 2,434 units of public housing by 1980 in North Tulsa. Willard Van, Tulsa’s
NAACP executive secretary, correctly predicted in the Tulsa Tribune that North Tulsa would
become an isolated majority low income Black neighborhood after the concentration of public
housing throughout the 1960s and 1970s (“TURA Still” 1967).
Tulsa also utilized federal funds for land acquisition for other proposed urban renewal
projects, including the Downtown Northwest project and the Westbank Area project. In 1967,
TURA bought 18 acres in Downtown Tulsa for a new plaza, office buildings, shopping centers,
apartments, and the 9-block Williams Center (Foresman 1967). Although TURA purchased the
property, private Tulsa businesses created the Metro Center together, which pledged to pay
TURA for the property in 10 years (Ibid). The Downtown Northwest project cleared multiple
historical buildings, blasting two large office buildings in 1970 (“2-Building” 1970).4 By the late
1970s, private developers with some local subsidies built the Bank of Oklahoma Tower, the
William Center, the Performing Arts Center, a pedestrian system, and Main Street Mall (District
1 Plan 1980). TURA also acquired 162 acres west of the Arkansas river near the Texaco refinery
3
4
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for the Westbank Area project (“City Renewal” 1969). TURA received multiple proposals for
Westbank, but after TURA cleared houses in Westbank, the federal funding dwindled and urban
renewal grants ended altogether in 1973. In 1975, Tulsa Junior College, now Community
College, purchased property for a new campus in Westbank (Southwest 2003).
Similar to other US cities, Interstate 244’s construction was funded and planned through
the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 and disproportionately destroyed Black properties and
neighborhoods. Interstate-244, a bypass route of I-44 to downtown Tulsa, cut directly through
the middle of Greenwood, where businesses and homes had slowly rebuilt in the decades
following the massacre. In 1967, Tulsa began clearing Greenwood businesses for the interstate
that was completed in 1975 (Looney 1967). Ed Goodwin, the publisher of the Oklahoma Eagle,
Tulsa’s Black-owned newspaper, was able to relocate to a building in the area that was not
cleared (Ibid). However, Goodwin said most Black property owners were unable to finance
relocation and were out of business, including L.H. Williams’ grocery store, Joe Bulloch’s barber
shop, Dr Bacholtz’s practice, A.G. Small’s hotel, Mrs. W. Miller’s hotel, a cafe, and a car garage
(Ibid). Greenwood Avenue diminished to a street under the shadows of an interstate, decimating
Black businesses and any accumulation of wealth that occurred post-1921.
All of the major urban renewal initiatives in Tulsa described above, the two Seminole
Hills projects, the Downtown Northwest project, an assortment of public housing projects, and
Interstate 244, capitalized on federal grants to push a similar agenda as in 1921: to stifle Black
homeownership and wealth and isolate Black poverty in Tulsa while promoting downtown as a
space for white profit and white enjoyment.
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Tulsa 2000-present
After the 1960s-1970s urban renewal era, federal grants for urban economic development
diminished and cities transitioned to local funding policies for projects. Tulsa utilized an
assortment of policies to fund downtown development. Vision 2025, Planitulsa, DAMP, multiple
upscale apartments receiving public subsidies, and three recent policies grant public dollars to
private businesses and developers, who are often white, while neglecting to provide public
programs and initiatives that would help Tulsans with economic need. Furthermore, these large
scale plans fail to include any projects in North Tulsa, Greenwood, or targeted towards Black
Tulsans, besides gentrifying apartments in Greenwood. The lack of addressing racial economic
disparities in present day public policies continue Tulsa’s legacy to promote white wealth and
hinder Black wealth by displacing, harming, and ignoring Black communities.
Vision 2025 was Tulsa’s first 21st century initiative for economic development that
prioritized private developers. After Tulsa failed to pass tax increases for city projects in 1997
and 2000, county voters in 2003 approved a one cent increase in sales tax for 13 years for
“economic development and capital improvements” (“Vision 2025”). However, only 40.7% of
registered voters voted for the proposition (Ibid). From 2003 to 2016, Vision 2025’s tax revenue
was approximately $638 million. The policy’s first proposition, to give Boeing financial
incentives to keep their manufacturing site in Tulsa, did not go into effect. However, three other
propositions did: a similar incentive for American Airline, Economic Development incentives,
and Capital Improvements (“Vision 2025”). Vision 2025 allocated $178 million to constructing
the BOK Center in downtown Tulsa and renovating the Convention Center. The policy claimed
that Tulsa’s success revolved around the private sector’s wellbeing, establishing a trend toward
utilizing public funds for private financial gains. This financing scheme is doubly
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disadvantageous to lower income residents as a regressive sales tax disproportionately burdens
low income residents and the programs the funding is directed toward fail to meet this
population’s need (Gale 1998). Vision 2025 showed Tulsa’s commitment to helping wealthier
business-owning residents while exacerbating low-income Tulsans’ financial struggles. Besides
meager funding to higher education and recreational improvements, Vision 2025’s
private-centric projects failed to improve the general wellbeing of residents.
Tulsa’s objective to promote private development progressed with Planitulsa and the
Downtown Area Master Plan. Planitulsa was a comprehensive plan adopted by the Tulsa
Metropolitan Area Planning Commission and approved by city council in 2010. The plan
includes five target areas: land use, transportation, economic development, housing, and parks,
trails, open spaces (“Planitulsa”). The policy specifically aimed for mixed use housing to
repopulate the downtown area and “enhance vibrant places of living and working, leisure and
activity, commerce and relaxation” (“Planitulsa”). Although the plan encompassed the entire city,
the Downtown Area Master Plan (DAMP), a parallel plan with PlaniTulsa to focus on downtown
development, allocated $20 million to housing development (“Planitulsa”). Similar to cities
across the United States, this policy read as a plan to gentrify, increasing housing costs and
encouraging expensive retail stores and restaurants to locate downtown. The plan also mapped
Greenwood incorrectly, see Map 2 below, and later labelled Greenwood as “Brady-Greenwood”
as one downtown area with the Arts District, further signifying efforts to replace historically
Black Greenwood. DAMP also registered the Tulsa Arts District, the Blue Dome District, and a
host of other buildings for historical preservation, but excluded Greenwood.
Tulsa’s lack of political action to work with Greenwood and North Tulsa community
members to invest in their neighborhoods and preserve Black Tulsa’s history while utilizing

35
public finances for other large scale development indicate Tulsa’s intention to erase the historic
Black neighborhood.
Map 2: Downtown Area Master Plan

Note: Greenwood is mapped on the north side of I-244, however Greenwood historically was located where ONEOK Ballpark
was constructed in 2008. DAMP Map: Crowley, Jack. 2010. Downtown Area Master Plan: Volume 1.

The entirety of downtown developments between 2008 and 2016 were estimated at a total
cost of $400 million, while projects under construction were estimated at $321 million, and
approximately $200 million was allocated for planned projects (Evatt). By 2016, 2,130 housing
units were built or planned across downtown, a majority in the Tulsa Arts District (three actually
in Greenwood) and the Blue Dome District; some were new construction and others were
renovations (“DAMP Progress”). Map 1 above shows the close proximity between these districts
and Greenwood. However, without affordable housing incentives, such as using inclusionary
zoning or community land trusts, downtown housing developments were often more expensive
units or luxury apartments. Furthermore, through Tax Increment Financing (TIF) revenue, tax
abatements from downtown’s Tax Incentive District, and Downtown Development Fund Loans,
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26 projects out of 46 total projects received local public subsidies (“DAMP Progress”). The Arts
District’s TIF collected property tax revenue increased after assessed values froze in 1993, which
continued until 2017. Similarly, Blue Dome’s TIF revenue began in 2003 and dissolved in 2016.5
Today the entire downtown maintains a Tax Incentive District, where property’s taxes can be
subsidized for five to six years. A 2016 Planitulsa report stated that ''these kinds of public
funding programs help ensure private investment in downtown’s future and create the urban
experience envisioned in Planitulsa'' (“Planitulsa Progress”). Yet, no public funding went
towards projects in North Tulsa in the same time period, continuing Tulsa’s prioritization of
private entities over neighborhoods who need public money.
The developments in the Tulsa Arts District and the Blue Dome District need to be
situated in the context of white supremacy in Tulsa. The former Brady Arts District, now Tulsa
Arts District, and Brady Street, were originally named after Tate Brady, a member of the Ku
Klux Klan in the 1920s and likely a leader and instigator of the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre.
Brady was on guard duty along Main Street all night on May 31st, 1921 (Krehbiel). In 2013, the
city council voted to change the street name to M.B. Brady, a photographer with no relation to
Tulsa (Krehbiel). Five years later in 2018, the city voted to change it to Reconciliation Way, after
years of resistance to the empty namesake (Krehbiel). In 2017, the Brady Arts District also
changed its name to Tulsa Arts District, however in city planning documents and many other
plaques or websites, the Brady name lives on. The racist namesake in conjunction with Tulsa’s
avid gentrification in the area symbolizes the overt racialized objective to further displace
Greenwood and Black residents.

5
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The city-supported gentrification was initiated by local funding incentives for seven
housing projects in the Arts District, Blue Dome, and Greenwood between 2010 and 2016. The
Tribune Building Lofts, whose website still uses the Brady Arts District name, used state and
federal historic tax credits, estimated at a $300 million value, and approximately $700,000 from
a 1996 housing sales tax to renovate a historic building into 35 apartments and retail use
(“DAMP Progress”). A city-backed $4 million low interest 10-year loan resulted in 75 luxury
residential units and a 196 car parking garage at the Metro at Brady (name has not changed)
(“DAMP Progress”). In the Blue Dome district, a new 162 unit complex, The Edge, received a
6-year tax abatement valued at $1.1 million and a renovated 18 unit complex, First Street Lofts,
obtained a 0% interest 10-year loan from Vision 2025 funds. Additionally, a planned project at
the Hartford Building requested tax abatement and development assistance funds.
Although DAMP cites the Arts District and Greenwood as one area, three housing
projects (see map below) surround historic Greenwood, particularly near the ONEOK field, the
$39.2 million ballpark that intrudes on the neighborhood (Marshall). Black business owners and
Black Tulsans have animosity towards ONEOK field. Mechelle Brown, the Greenwood Cultural
Center program coordinator, told the Tulsa World that many Black Tulsans refuse to attend
games or support the business (Marshall). After the city council promised the new field would
bring jobs to Greenwood, Brown said “it did not bring jobs to our community, and it has not had
a huge impact economically” (Marshall). However, Tulsa continues to grow around the
development, including tax abatements for the Greenarch Apartments’ 70 new developed units
and The View Luxury Apartments’ $4.1 million 203 new unit development. The Detroit Lofts, a
renovation project of a warehouse building, received a $769,000 10-year 0% interest loan.
Although the project is the only new downtown housing with affordable housing units, the 16
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units are targeted for Teach for America teachers, who often are not Tulsans (“DAMP”). These
developments have increased the cost of property and housing in Greenwood, the Arts District,
and Blue Dome, where the average renting rate has increased from $12 per square foot to $22 per
square foot and is expected to continue rising (Evatt). Map 3 below identifies where the housing
developments that received public subsidies are spatially located across the downtown
neighborhoods. Tulsa activist Kristi Williams has witnessed gentrification in Greenwood
happening for years, stating that “this city has been masterful at pulling people away from the
area” (Marshall).
To supplement the above findings, I subsetted 2001 and 2016 census and eviction data to
examine downtown’s demographic changes.6 I found that the percentage of white residents
remained constant between 2001 and 2016, at 57%, while the percentage of Black residents
decreased from 27% to 17%. In terms of housing, the percent of renters increased 5% while the
average monthly rent increased from $315 to $962 in 15 years (inflation only accounts for $111
of that increase). Financially, the median household income increased $15,924 and the median
property value increased 112.67%. The number of evictions nearly quadrupled by 2016, an
eviction rate of 7.63% for downtown Tulsa. These data represent a shift in wealthier downtown
residents along with soaring property values, likely a result of the publicly funded gentrification
projects.

6
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Map 3: Housing Developments in Tulsa Receiving Public Subsidies

Currently, Tulsa plans to continue TIF policies and downtown loan funds for new and
renovated development in downtown Tulsa. TIFs for the Tulsa Arts District and the Blue Dome
District have expired, but just last year the Tulsa City Council approved and adopted the
Downtown Master TIF Policy (“City of Tulsa”). Rather than the tax increment revenue being
collected and spent in the same smaller district within downtown Tulsa (how it previously
operated), the revenue from the nine new increment districts can be spent anywhere in downtown
Tulsa.7
Additionally, a new Downtown Development Redevelopment Fund of $5 million became
available on October 1st 2020 for private developers to apply for downtown development loans
(Evatt). Tulsa is also starting an Affordable Housing Trust Fund where landlords are offered
incentives for renting to tenants receiving housing subsidies or tenants with past evictions
(“Affordable Housing”). Agencies that work directly with landlords will be able to receive grants
7
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from the city and give them to landlords to cover tenant’s unpaid rent or utilities. Individual
grants are capped at 3 months rent or $3,000, whichever is less (“Affordable Housing”). The
Downtown Master TIF Policy, the Downtown Development Development Fund, and the
Affordable Housing Trust Fund show Tulsa’s continuous commitment to prioritize private
entities with public funding. In all three periods, the local government has disregarded Black
Tulsans and utilized racial violence and public policy to disinvest in their communities, while
prioritizing investment for white businesses and property.

Oklahoma City
Table 3: 1933-Present
1933

Segregation Line

1935

Allen v. Oklahoma City

1969 - 1979

Kerr-McGee Corporation

1976 - 1989

Interstate 35 and 235

2000 - 2027

Downtown TIF District

1993 - 2019

Metropolitan Area Projects Plans (MAPS)

2008 - Present

OKC Urban Renewal Authority Grants
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Map 4: Oklahoma City Neighborhoods Referenced

Located 106 miles southwest, Oklahoma City’s drier climate and red dirt contrasts with
Tulsa’s more humid, green climate. In the late 19th century, Oklahoma City was settled by the
Land Run and became the state capital soon after Oklahoma became a state in 1907. Oil also
became the city’s largest economic industry in the early 1900s, which continues to be the biggest
industry along with natural gas. In the 1920s and 30s Deep Deuce was the city’s thriving
neighborhood of Black culture and jazz. Today, Oklahoma City’s metropolitan area population is
1.4 million people.
Oklahoma City is similar to Tulsa in many ways, however Oklahoma City lacks a
defining violent event that may structure its subsequent path, such as the Tulsa Race Massacre.
Unfortunately, the city’s historically prosperous Black neighborhood, Deep Deuce, also suffered
from racialized policies in three similar significant time periods: 1930s, 1960s-1980s, and
2000-present.
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Deep Deuce is near Oklahoma City’s central business district and a mile and a half south
of the state capitol, see Map 4 for Deep Deuce’s location. The approximately 8 block area is
adjacent to Bricktown, which is labelled the city’s entertainment district, and bordered by
railroads on the south and west and I-235 on the east (Payne and Greiner 112). Similar to
Greenwood, Deep Deuce was Black residents’ original neighborhood and as time progressed
Black communities moved and populated areas northeast of Deep Deuce. After intense
segregation in the 1930s and 1940s, Deep Deuce and subsequent Black neighborhoods faced
displacement and destruction from urban renewal initiatives and interstate construction, but these
processes happened slower and later than Tulsa’s. In the 2000s, gentrification heightened
1970s-80s urban renewal efforts to displace Black residents, resulting in dramatic demographic
changes in Deep Deuce.
1930-1940
In 1933, Oklahoma Governor Murray used executive action to create a segregation line to
block the Deep Deuce neighborhood from growing their community further north by declaring
martial law. Local city officials enacted a zoning ordinance where Black persons could not buy
or rent housing in the North portion of Deep Deuce to ensure the governor’s segregation line was
imposed (Payne and Greiner 2017). This ordinance stated that “it is unlawful for any [Black
person] to occupy as a residence in any house or building located in a block where in a majority
of the lots used as residences are occupied as white persons” (Allen vs Oklahoma City).
Onie Allen purchased lots 7 and 8 in block 22 of Oklahoma City, where the ordinance
was enforced. The city sent Allen written notice that she was in violation of the ordinance on
November 13th, 1934; after she refused to move, a warrant was issued for her arrest. Allen
claimed the ordinance was in violation of the 14th amendment and the case Allen vs. Oklahoma
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City was appealed in district court. Two years later in 1935, this language was deemed
unconstitutional by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, overturning the racial zoning ordinance.
However, this de jure segregation had lasting impact on where Deep Deuce residents could live.
The Black community continued to thrive in Deep Deuce by promoting community
building and Black businesses and talents, resisting discriminatory public policies. However,
legal segregation continued for decades through redlining. As Black residents needed more
housing after World War II, Walter J. Edwards, a prominent Black businessman, built 175 single
family homes on his property in 1946, establishing the Edwards Community and paving the way
for Carverdale and Creston Hills developments (all remain predominantly Black neighborhoods)
(Johnson). Map 4 above highlights these neighborhoods. Edwards was likely the first developer
in the US to secure funding from the Federal Housing Administration for Black neighborhoods
(Johnson).
1960-1980
Without having to rebuild from an event that decimated their community, such as in
Greenwood, Deep Deuce continued to thrive until the neighborhood faced economic decline in
the 1960s and urban renewal initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s. The Oklahoma City Urban
Renewal Authority (OCURA) was created in 1961 with the appointment of five commissioners
to start the process of blight clearance. However, urban renewal initiatives did not occur until the
later half of the 1970s and into the 1980s. Like Tulsa and elsewhere, highways carved through
predominantly Black communities. In 1976, the federal government approved I-235 and I-35,
leading to the destruction of many blocks in Deep Deuce, the adjacent Harrison-Walnut
neighborhood, and other Northeast neighborhoods, such as the Edwards Community, separating
Black communities and cutting off Deep Deuce from Northeast Oklahoma City (Payne and
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Greiner 2017). Although Black residents spoke out against the interstate through protests and
petitions, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation continued the interstate plan by buying up
most of the necessary property (Payne and Greiner 115). Many lots that were not bought for the
interstate were purchased by private entities, including the Kerr-McGee Corporation which
began purchasing Deep Deuce property in 1969 and by the end of the 1970s owned 11% of Deep
Deuce land. Kerr-McGee had sold almost all their land to developers by 2002 (Ibid).8 An
additional quarter of Deep Deuce property was eventually acquired by OCURA, mostly through
the right of eminent domain (Payne and Greiner 116). Although Oklahoma City faced a few
harmful urban renewal projects, Tulsa had more urban renewal initiatives that were larger in
scale and more detrimental to Black wealth.
2000-present
Oklahoma City’s development efforts continued throughout the 1990s and the 2000s
through four Metropolitan Area Projects Plans (MAPS) as well as numerous housing
developments initiated by OCURA and funded through an assortment of TIF revenue and local
loans, both policies similar to Tulsa’s Planitulsa and DAMP. A majority of urban development
projects in Oklahoma City were planned through the four MAPS policies that have spanned more
than two decades (“MAPS History”). In 1993, city voters passed the original MAPS, which
increased the sales tax by one-cent and generated $254 million for new sports venues, a
convention center, upscale apartments in Deep Deuce, and two dozen new homes in the JFK
neighborhood (Downtown Housing Demand Study 2005). After an extension of the original
MAPS in 1998, a new policy, MAPS For Kids, was proposed and passed in 2001 to build or
renovate 70 Oklahoma City public school buildings, costing $514 million (“MAPS History”).
8

Kerr-McGee is a multinational oil and gas company. They were heavily interested in Deep Deuce real estate
because the area sits above part of the Oklahoma City oilfield (Payne and Greiner 129)
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MAPS 3 was proposed and passed in 2009, generating another $777 for capital improvements,
including riverfront improvements and a downtown streetcar line (“MAPS 3”). Most recently,
city voters approved MAPS 4 in December 2019, which will fund 16 projects through generating
$978 million over the next 8 years (“MAPS 4”). Although homelessness is one of the project’s
objectives, the largest allocation of $115 million is going towards renovations for the Chesapeake
Arena (“MAPS 4”). These planning policies show Oklahoma City’s propensity to spend public
funds, generated via a tax policy that disadvantaged lower income residents, for private profits
that benefit middle to upper class residents.
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Map 5: Housing Developments in Oklahoma City Receiving Public Subsidies

The second major component of Oklahoma City’s recent urban development policies are
the numerous housing projects initiated by OCURA in Deep Deuce and the surrounding areas
between 2010 and 2020. Map 5 above shows where these housing developments are in relation
to downtown districts. The largest urban renewal project in Deep Deuce, The Hill, is a $32
million townhouse development receiving $2 million in TIF revenue; construction began in 2009
and is projected to finish in 2021 (“2019-2020 Annual Report”). Other apartment developments
in Deep Deuce also received public funds, including $1 million in TIF for the Maywood
Apartments which was completed in Fall 2013 and a 250 unit apartment complex, Steelyard,
which received $1.5 million in grants and TIF and was completed in late 2017 (“2015-2016
Annual Report”). Housing developments continued in the Deep Deuce area, such as Level
Urban, a mixed-use rental housing area receiving $600,000 in TIF and projected to open in 2022
(“2019-2020 Annual Report”). Hotels in Deep Deuce also have quickly popped up, some
receiving local grants and HUD grants (“2016-2017 Annual Report”). The JFK neighborhood, a
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similar area where houses were torn down in the 1980s, has a large housing development and
received $9.15 million for 136 affordable units, which opened in 2017 (“2017-2018 Annual
Report”). These were the only publicly funded OCURA developments that had affordable units,
whereas new housing in Deep Deuce is overwhelmingly expensive and targeted towards middle
to upper class single adults.
In order to compare demographic changes in Deep Deuce and downtown Oklahoma City
between 2000 and 2016, I again used census and eviction data. I found that 73.55% of Deep
Deuce and Bricktown residents were Black in 2000. By 2016 only 4.67% of residents were
Black.9 The median property value substantially increased from $39,200 in 2000 to $369,700 in
2016.10 Moreover, the average selling price for residential property in Deep Deuce was over
$500,000 by 2015 (Realtor 2015). The more general downtown Oklahoma City also witnessed
similar changes, but not as drastic as Deep Deuce’s.11 For example, the percent of Black residents
decreased 17.46% and the median property value increased from $31,883 to $232,600.12 Similar
to Greenwood’s relationship with the Arts District in Tulsa, residential buildings and businesses
labelled themselves as located in Bricktown but actually resided in Deep Deuce (Payne and
Greiner 120). These policies and subsequent major demographic shifts signal that Deep Deuce
was heavily gentrified in the 2000s after efforts slowly began in urban renewal initiatives
decades earlier.

9

See Figure 1; one census tract encompasses Deep Deuce and Bricktown
See Figure 2 in appendix
11
Subsetted data using 6 census tracts that make up downtown
12
See Tables 8 and 9 in appendix
10
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Figure 1: Percent Black Residents in Deep Deuce 2001-2016

Tulsa and Oklahoma City Today by the Numbers
Tulsa and Oklahoma City’s historic Black neighborhoods, Greenwood and Deep Deuce,
suffered from racial violence and discriminatory housing and economic development policies
throughout the past century. Greenwood and Deep Deuce are no longer the primary Black
neighborhood in either city, likely an effect of these historical policies, which displaced Black
residents. While Greenwood has shrunk to a small collection of businesses, Deep Deuce was
heavily gentrified in the past decade. In present day, North Tulsa and Northeast Oklahoma City
are the majority Black neighborhoods, which I define as the census tracts with 50% or more
Black residents in the same geographic area.13 However, a majority of the tracts in both areas are
70% or more Black residents. The decimation of Greenwood from the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre
13

Census tracts 2,5,6,7,8,9,10,62 in Tulsa and 5,4,15,14,13,28,27,26,30,29,79,52.01,52.02,61,60 in OKC
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and larger-scale urban renewal projects in the 1960s-70s in North Tulsa have generally placed
Black residents in North Tulsa in a worse economic position than their Oklahoma City
counterparts. On the other hand, Oklahoma City’s Deep Deuce neighborhood faced more drastic
gentrification throughout the 2000s than Greenwood. Local policies, spurred by federal grants or
national competition, have caused problems for Black communities in both cities. The data
below shows that North Tulsa’s housing values are faring slightly worse economically than
Northeast Oklahoma City, supporting my hypothesis that the Race Massacre’s historical legacy
continues to affect the Black community.14
Demographics and housing variables for Tulsa and Oklahoma City in 2001 and 2016 are
fairly similar. In 2016, 62.4% of Tulsa residents were white and 11.97% were Black, while
52.71% of Oklahoma City residents were white and 17.32% were Black.15 Both cities are
minority Black and highly segregated, shown by the contrast between dark purple and pink
census tracts in Map 6 and Map 7 below, which display the percent of Black or African
American residents in each census tract (dark purple is 50% or more Black residents) along with
the circles that show the median property value in each tract (smallest circle is $22,300 to
$60,000).
In 2001 and 2016, Tulsa’s overall median property value and median household income
were marginally higher than Oklahoma City’s, approximately a $10,000 difference in property
value and a $3,000 difference in income, but Tulsa’s values grew at a slightly slower rate over
the 15 years. Median rent values in both 2001 and 2016 were also fairly similar, $858 a month in
Tulsa and $830 in Oklahoma City in 2016, with both cities seeing a $300 per month increase in

14

I do not have enough substantial evidence to claim a causal relationship between the Race Massacre and the
current wealth disparity between North Tulsa and Tulsa.
15
See Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 in appendix
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the 15 year span. Currently, Tulsa has the 11th highest eviction rate in the US at 7.77%, while
16

Oklahoma City’s is the 20th highest at 6.19%.17 These general racial and housing data imply that
while both cities are fairly similar, Tulsa has a slightly higher housing cost, property value, and
rent than Oklahoma City, without a substantially higher median income. These findings suggest
that Tulsa’s higher eviction rate could possibly be explained by higher housing costs and
stagnant income.

16
17

See Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 in appendix
According to Eviction Lab’s City Eviction Rate
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Map 6: Tulsa 2016 Percent Black Residents and Median Property Value
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Map 7: Oklahoma City 2016 Percent Black Residents and Median Property Value
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Median housing value by census tract is one way to assess the influence of historical
violence and follow how public policies today affect racial disparities. Map 6 and Map 7 above
show that property values tend to be lower in the predominantly Black census tracts (dark
purple) while property values are higher in the predominantly white census tracts (larger green
circles in the white tracks). The maps represent this relationship by showing a more drastic
difference in circle size (i.e. property value) in Tulsa compared to Oklahoma City in the majority
Black census tracts. Some majority white tracts in Oklahoma City have smaller circles (lower
property values) than majority Black census tracts, such as Southwest Oklahoma City compared
to Northeast Oklahoma City. This dynamic shows that the property value gap between majority
Black and white neighborhoods is less drastic in Oklahoma City than in Tulsa. Although white
poverty exists in both cities, Tulsa’s white majority census tracts with lower property value are
similar to the majority Black census tracts, whereas Oklahoma City’s majority white census
tracts have much lower property values than the majority Black census tracts.
In addition, comparing the median property values and median household incomes in
different geographic areas in both Tulsa and Oklahoma City indicate property value disparities.
The property value disparity is higher in Tulsa, where North Tulsa’s median property value is
$72,237, compared to Tulsa’s overall median property value, $138,439.18 On the other hand,
Northeast Oklahoma City’s median property value is $91,984 while its overall property value is
$124,475.19 While both cities have a gap in property values for their majority Black
neighborhoods, North Tulsa’s property value difference is more than double that of Oklahoma
City’s, $66,202 compared to $32,491. Additionally, Northeast Oklahoma City’s median
household income is approximately $2,000 greater than North Tulsa’s and the median gross rent
18
19

See Tables 14 and 15 in appendix
See Tables 16 and 17 in appendix

54
is also around $100 more per month. Although Northeast Oklahoma City has more renters than
20

North Tulsa, the eviction rate in North Tulsa is 1% higher than Northeast Oklahoma City’s. 21
This housing data, particularly the median property values, provides evidence that North Tulsa
has a higher wealth disparity than Oklahoma City.
When compared to national averages, Tulsa’s Black residents fare worse in access to
homeownership assets, according to a Brookings’ report. Across the United States,
homeownership properties in majority Black neighborhoods are on average valued at
approximately half of what homes in white neighborhoods are valued (Perry 2). Perry, the
report’s lead author, found that homes in majority Black neighborhoods are “undervalued by
$48,000 per home on average, amounting to $156 billion in cumulative losses” (Perry 15). While
this is a stark national wealth disparity, the report ranked Tulsa as the fourth metropolitan area
with the most devalued Black neighborhoods (-40%). Perry defines devalued neighborhoods as
houses and property in majority Black areas that are valued less than white neighborhood
equivalents when housing quality is constant. Furthermore, Oklahoma City was ranked as the
fourth lowest metropolitan area for devaluation (0%) (Perry 20).
Perry’s report highlights the correlation between Black neighborhoods with greater home
devaluation and Black children’s chances of upward mobility, showing the detrimental
consequences of Tulsa’s policies and racial actions on Black children, and eventually adults, in
the Tulsa community (Perry 3). Although casual relationships cannot be drawn, the evidence is
suggestive that Tulsa’s Black community faces greater barriers in homeownership wealth
accumulation than Oklahoma City.

20
21

See Tables 14, 15, 16, and 17 in appendix
Calculated by dividing the total evictions by percentage of renter households multiplied by the population
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Conclusion
Racialized acts of violence and public policy work hand in hand to strip wealth away
from Black Americans, resulting in wealth disparities across the United States. American cities
across the country utilized redlining and experienced white flight and urban decay. Current
policies continue to encourage and subsidize homeownership, augmenting the national Black and
white wealth disparity. This paper expands the conversation around wealth disparity and housing
by connecting the cycle of racial violence with public policy. In Tulsa, the 1921 Race Massacre
and subsequent violence against Black people, such as police brutality, works in conjunction
with housing and economic development policies to destroy Black wealth and prevent its
rebuilding.
The Tulsa Race Massacre decimated Black property and subsequent local policies
prevented Black Tulsans from quickly rebuilding. After decades of community building in
Greenwood, urban removal efforts that were funded from the federal level and implemented
through local agencies again displaced Black-owned properties for interstates and rental housing
projects. In the 21st century, Tulsa’s urban policies shifted to increase downtown economic
development and luxury apartments, gentrifying Greenwood. The past century has led to the
eradication of Black Tulsa wealth through racial violence and the implementation of policies that
destroy and prevent Black-owned property.
Victims of the Tulsa Race Massacre and their descendants never received reparations
from Tulsa or Oklahoma government agencies. The lack of reparations show Tulsa’s
complacency with white violence against Black communities. Not paying adequate reparations
shows that Tulsa officials tolerate white violence while future generations of Greenwood
residents have less accumulated wealth than they rightfully should.
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Reparations to Black descendants of the Tulsa Race Massacre and general programs
targeted towards North Tulsa could offset Tulsa’s past actions. In a 2020 report, The Human
Rights Watch concluded that the Governor, state legislator, mayor, and city council should make
reparations in the form of direct payments, scholarships for students, establish an economic
development enterprise zone in Greenwood, and create a memorial for victims and survivors
after reviewing the Tulsa Race Massacre Commission (Heath). Tulsa should follow Saint Paul
MN, Asheville NC, and Evanston IL efforts in creating reparations commissions (Prather 2021).
Specifically, Tulsa needs to provide down payment grants, housing revitalization grants, and rent
subsidies to Black residents, particularly in North Tulsa (Ray and Perry).
Evanston’s city council recently passed a reparations plan in the form of housing grants
on March 22nd, 2021. The city is granting up to $25,000 for down payments or repairs to Black
households, and their direct descendants, that lived in Evanston between 1919 and 1969, when
city zoning ordinance enforced housing discrimination (Treisman). Cicely Fleming, the
alderwoman that voted against the reparations plan, believes that this housing program does not
give Black residents autonomy (Ibid). I agree with Alderwoman Fleming that direct payments
are a better form of reparations than housing grants, however the political difficulty of passing a
direct payments reparations policy at the city level would slow down the process of redistributing
resources to Black residents. Cities should pass and implement housing reparations policies,
while advocating for direct payments at the federal level.
Using Reshawn Ray and Andre M Perry’s reparations framework for devalued Black
neighborhoods, I think it is necessary that Black Tulsans who are interested in buying property
receive large payments to cover the down payment and current Black homeowners receive
payments to refurbish their homes. Additionally, rent should be compensated in the form of
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rental subsidies. In conjunction with local grants, low and fixed interest rates and property tax
caps in North Tulsa and Greenwood would be imperative to prevent gentrification of the historic
Black neighborhood (Ray and Perry).
In addition to large payments for housing equality, Tulsa needs education and food
initiatives. The 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre Centennial Commission has created a curriculum to
educate Oklahomans on the Tulsa Race Massacre along with remembering victims and survivors
(Heath). Public and private schools state-wide should adopt this curriculum. Furthermore, North
Tulsa is a food desert, without a full grocery store within a five mile radius. Instead, Dollar
Generals continue to populate the neighborhoods. Tulsa activists have been fighting for
Community Development Block Grant funding to put a traditional grocery store in North Tulsa,
but efforts have not come to fruition (Heath). Rather than funding million dollar parks in the
majority white midtown Tulsa, affordable, wide ranging grocery options need to open up across
North Tulsa. These are fundamental human rights that Tulsa is neglecting to provide. Without
adequate education and food Black Tulsans are left in a cycle of poverty.
Although local programs are a necessary first step, a national program is financially more
feasible because state and local municipalities are unable to have a budget deficit. William A.
Darity and Kirsten Mullen provide a comprehensive framework for a federal reparations
program. The legislative branch should propose the reparations bill rather than starting lawsuits
through the judicial branch. Historical racialized actions were legal at the time and lawsuits
during the urban renewal time period and after would have to prove that government officials or
agencies were intentionally enforcing discriminatory policies or actions.
Darity and Mullen state, and I agree, that Congress should first establish a commission to
analyze the history of racial injustice and offer a comprehensive report. Two possible criteria for
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reparations eligibility are the ability to trace ancestry to slavery and identify as Black or African
American twelve years before the commission is established. I also think Black Americans, and
their descendants, that have faced a racialized act of violence, such as the Tulsa Race Massacre,
should receive reparations. The racial wealth gap “is the most robust indicator of the cumulative
economic effects of white supremacy in the United States” (Darity and Mullen 263). Therefore,
the amount of reparations paid to Black Americans should be calculated from a measurement of
the wealth gap. The 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances found that the gap in mean household
wealth between white and Black Americans is $795,000. If the average Black household is 3.31
persons, then the estimated individual gap, and direct payment amount, is $240,000. With 10
million Black households nationwide, the total bill would average around $7.95 trillion.
Congress needs to act immediately to pass H.R. 40, an act introduced in 2019, to begin a
commission to study federal reparations. From here, legislators need to act quickly to research
and draft a comprehensive bill that implements reparations. The only way to work towards
wealth equity is to pay Black Americans with zero strings attached.
Housing reparation payments to Black North Tulsans, comprehensive education on the
Race Massacre, adequate grocery store options, and federal direct payments to Black
descendants of slavery and race massacres could alleviate the white and Black wealth disparity in
Tulsa following a century of racial violence and public policies situated in structural racism.
Americans who support this path need to work now to pressure local and federal representatives
to pass this bill and build grassroot support in their communities to fight systemic racism in
every realm. White Americans can act now by distributing their generational wealth to Black
Americans through mutual aid.
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*Census tract 5 is where the seminole hills urban renewal project occurred.
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Map 8

Note: TIF districts in downtown Tulsa. Downtown Master TIF Policy Resolution. 2020. Resolution no. 20067. City of Tulsa.

Map 9

Note: TIF districts in downtown Tulsa. Downtown Master TIF Policy Resolution. 2020. Resolution no. 20067. City of Tulsa.

66
Photo 1

Note: Clearance from Downtown Northwest urban renewal project in downtown Tulsa“ Craig, Royce. “2-Building Demolition
Completed” Tulsa Tribune. July 13th, 1970.

Photo 2

Note: Housing development construction in downtown Tulsa near Greenwood and ONEOK Field, January 2021
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Photo 3

Note: Current Greenwood district in Tulsa, the overpass is I-244 that was built in the 1960s and 1970s, January 2021

Photo 4

Note: Housing development construction in downtown Tulsa Arts District, January 2021
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Figure 2
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